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Te impact of punitive damages on media libel
litigation remains an issue very much alive at the begin-
ning of the new millennium.A February 2002 headline
in Editor & Publisher magazine, the major indepen-
dent trade magazine devoted to the American news-
paper industry, 2 warned: "Punitive Damage Awards on
the Rise in Media Libel Cases" I The headline intro-
duced an article summarizing a 20-year study by the
Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC). 4 The study
revealed a 136 percent increase in the total damages
awarded at trials despite a 32 percent drop in the total
number of media libel trials from the 1980's through
the 1990's.1 The study further revealed that punitive
damages represented a higher proportion of all dam-
ages in the 1990's. 6 The article quoted Sandra S.
Baron, executive director of the LDRC, who explained
that juror attitudes about the media contribute to, and
ultimately cause, this rise in punitive damages. As
Ms. Baron explained to Editor & Publisher, "You hope
no newspaper is inhibited from doing a story simply
because of the possibility of high jury awards, but it
would be unrealistic to think the media turns a totally
blind eye."
8
This Article explores the role of punitive dam-
ages in media libel cases by measuring the quantity and
quality of libel appeals for a ten-year period in states
with and without punitive damages. Specifically, the
Article identifies appellate court decisions for media
libel cases over a ten year period from 1986 to 1995,
comparing five states with punitive damages (Alabama,
New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota and Ten-
nessee) to five states without punitive damages (Loui-
siana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon and Washing-
ton). Each appeal of a federal or state media libel
case was coded for the following characteristics: year,
whether the media won or lost at both the trial
and appeals stages, existence of a pretrial summary
judgment, and the size of punitive and other damage
awards at both the trial and appeals stages.
The remainder of this introduction differenti-
ates between punitive damages and other classifica-
tions of civil damages and includes a discussion of
three randomly selected media libel cases from one
year to illustrate the magnitude of different types of
libel damages. Section I, "Supreme Court Jurispru-
dence on Punitive Damages' examines the analysis
of punitive damages by the high court in media and
nonmedia libel cases. Section II, "Proposals to Reform
the Law of Libel," examines the concept of prohibit-
ing punitive damages as one of a range of reforms with
the potential for reducing libel burden on mass media
defendants. Section III, "Methodology and Its Precur-
sors," explores the precedent in media law research
for measuring the impact of a legal provision by sys-
tematically measuring a universe of appellate court
decisions. Section IV, "Methodology," describes the
techniques used to measure media libel appeals for ten
years in ten states while Section V, "Findings," reports
the results of the ten-year, ten state analysis of media
libel appeals. Section V,"Conclusions and Discussion,"
wraps up this Article by examining the ramifications of
the results produced by the ten-state study.
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Black's Law Dictionary defines punitive dam-
ages as "damages awarded in addition to actual dam-
ages when the defendant acted with recklessness,
malice, or deceit." 9 Punitive damages, also called
exemplary damages, vindictive damages, smart money,
and punies, "are intended to punish and thereby deter
blameworthy conduct." '0 Actual or compensatory
damages "compensate for a proven injury or loss" and
"repay actual losses." " General damages, however, do
not require specific claims or proof to be sustained
because the law presumes that such damages follow
from the type of wrong complained of. 12
The magnitude of each damage type varies
considerably in libel cases. An award might contain
only modest or even no actual damages, such as dam-
ages awarded for provable losses in an occupation or
business.Awards ordinarily contain significant general
damages to compensate for losses in such difficult-to-
quantify areas as reputation and mental suffering. Fur-
thermore, depending on the degree of the defendant's
egregiousness or maliciousness, punitive or exemplary
damages may be awarded as a multiple of the general
or actual damages awarded.
When a state prohibits or limits punitive dam-
ages, it diminishes the influence of the category of
damages most threatening to media defendants. Puni-
tive damages are the most subjective and unpredict-
able category of damages and often account for the
largest amounts of money awarded. Three randomly
selected 1992 libel cases illustrate this pattern. '1 In
Henrichs v. Pivarnik, a community newspaper in Indiana
accused a member of the Indiana Supreme Court of
having ties to organized crime. 1' At the libel trial,
the jury awarded plaintiff $80,000 in punitive damages
but no compensatory damages. The court of appeals
upheld the decision. ," In Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v.
Globe International, Inc., an elderly resident of Moun-
tain Home, Arkansas, sued the supermarket tabloid
Sun after it ran a photograph of her under the false
headline, "Pregnancy Forces Granny to Quit Work at
Age 101." 6 An eight-person jury in Federal District
Court awarded the plaintiff $650,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $850,000 in punitive damages. 7 The
U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the punitive damages but
ordered a re-evaluation of the compensatory dam-
ages. 8 A third libel case, Hinerman
v. The Daily Gazette Co., involved
a private attorney who sued the
Charleston Gazette in WestVirginia
over two editorials that criticized
Sto the attorney for collecting a $12,000
fee for representing a client over a
workers' compensation claim. '9 The
jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000
in actual damages and $300,000 in
punitive damages.2 ° The WestVirginia Supreme Court
of Appeals upheld the damage award on a split vote.2'
The above cases illustrate the potentially dra-
matic effect of punitive damages on the total amount
of damages awarded in media libel cases. Had Indiana,
Arkansas and West Virginia prohibited punitive dam-
ages, the total damages awarded would have been
reduced from $80,000 to zero, from $1,500,000 to
$650,000, and from $375,000 to $75,000. A ban on
punitive damages would result in a collective decrease
in damages among the three cases from $1,955,000 to
$725,000. Punitive damages clearly represent a major
component in the equation that determines how much
punishment media organizations may suffer for pub-
lishing defamatory falsehoods. Limiting or prohibiting
punitive damages will significantly limit the financial lia-
bility facing mass media.
The chilling effect of punitive damages, and
damages in general, concerned the U.S. Supreme Court
from the start of its involvement in libel jurisprudence.
Hints of this concern permeated the Court's initial
substantive libel decision, New York Times v. Sullivan.22 In
his majority opinion, Justice Brennan noted that sub-
jective standards influenced the $500,000 jury verdict
that resulted. 23 The award included compensatory
and punitive damages, but the jury verdict did not dif-
ferentiate between the two. 24 Furthermore, the jury
was allowed to award punitive damages despite plain-
tiff's failure to show the amount of actual damages
suffered.25 Justice Brennan additionally observed that
the $500,000 in civil damages was one thousand times
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greater than the maximum fine allowed by the state of
Alabama in criminal libel suits. 26 Later in the opinion
he remarked:"The fear of damage awards under a rule
such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may
be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecu-
tion under a criminal statute" 27
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring with the
majority's opinion in New York Times, also discussed
the threatening nature of civil libel damages.28 They
explained, "The half-million-dollar verdict does give
dramatic proof, however, that state libel laws threaten
the very existence of an American press virile enough
to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold
enough to criticize the conduct of public officials' 29
Black and Douglas believed the actual malice rule, by
itself, and without additional limitations, provided the
press with insufficient protection against libel suits
brought by public officials. 30
Two years later, the Court again expressed
reservations concerning the amount of protection
enjoyed by the press from libel suits brought by public
officials in Rosenblatt v. Baer, a decision that expanded
the actual malice rule applied to elected officials in
New York Times to include appointed government offi-
cials as potential libel plaintiffs. "' Justice Black, again
with Justice Douglas, authored a concurring and dis-
senting opinion explaining: "Half-million-dollar judg-
ments for libel damages like those awarded against the
New YorkTimes will not be stopped by requirements
that 'malice' be found, however that term is defined.
Such a requirement is little protection against high
emotions and deep prejudices which frequently per-
vade local communities where libel suits are tried' 32
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, decided five years after
Rosenblatt, Justices Marshall and Stewart dissented
from the majority to advocate the imposition of limits
on damages as a method of blunting the threat of libel
suits. 33
In Rosenbloom,a plurality of the Court expanded
the actual malice rule to cover any news involving
matters of general or public interest or concern.
The case involved an award of $25,000 in general
damages and $725,000 in punitive
damages to a distributor of nudist
magazines in Philadelphia in a suit
against a radio station. " The t
plurality opinion, authored by Jus-
tice Brennan and joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
reversed the jury verdict. 36 Mar-
shall's dissenting opinion advocated limiting damages
as a more effective method for reducing the threat of
libel than expanding the actual malice rule. 37 Accord-
ing to Marshall, "the size of the potential judgment
that may be rendered against the press must be the
most significant factor in producing self-censorship"' 38
He believed the unlimited discretion afforded juries
in awarding damages rendered the end result of libel
trials "unpredictable." 31 Marshall wished to restrict
libel damages to "proved, actual injuries" and to "real
injuries" 40
Three years later in Gertz v.Welch Justices Mar-
shall and Stewart convinced the Supreme Court to
adopt the approach advocated in their Rosenbloom dis-
sent.4 ' In a five to four decision, the Court reversed
the Rosenbloom pluralitywhich had extended the actual
malice rule to virtually any newsworthy issue.42 Instead,
the Gertz majority voted to require a lesser fault stan-
dard in most libel suits and to restrict damage awards.43
Characterizing the libel plaintiff as neither a govern-
ment official nor a public figure but rather a private
personality not required to prove actual malice, the
Court ruled that "so long as they do not impose lia-
bility without fault, the States may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuri-
ous to a private individual' 44 The Court also ruled
that henceforth, a punitive damage award required
proof of actual malice.45 Justice Blackmun welcomed
this new doctrine in his concurring opinion, believing
that removing the specters of presumed and punitive
damages, in the absence of actual malice, eliminated
a significant and powerful motive for self-censorship. 46
In dissent Justice White referred to the constitutional
limits on punitive damages as "radical changes in the
law and severe invasions of the prerogatives of the
states" as well as "a classic example of judicial over-
kill." 47 Aside from the opinion of Justice White, the
above precedent demonstrates how the U.S. Supreme
Court utilized the First Amendment to restrict, but
not prohibit, punitive damage awards in media libel
cases.
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While the Court utilized the FirstAmendment
to confront the threat of punitive damage awards in
media cases, it also utilized the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict punitive
damage awards in non-media civil cases. In BMW v.
Gore, the Court invalidated a jury award of $4,000
in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive
damages levied against a car dealer who had repainted
a new vehicle without informing the owner.48 In ruling
that the Due Process Clause required that punitive
damages be awarded according to the degree of rep-
rehensibility, the Court vocalized its concern over how
the $2,000,000 in punitive damages equaled 500 times
the compensatory damages awarded. 49 According to
the Court, "When the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to
I ... the award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial
eyebrow."' 50 Finding the ratio grossly excessive and
arbitrary, the Court concluded the award violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.5'
A year prior to BMW, a non-media case con-
cerning an overturned three-wheel all-terrain vehicle
prompted a majority of the Supreme Court to dis-
cuss the great potential for jury mischief in awarding
punitive damages after a jury awarded $735,512 in
compensatory damages and a staggering $5 million in
punitive damages.52 The Oregon Supreme Court had
refused to review the punitive damage award because
of a provision in the Oregon Constitution that barred
such review except in instances where no substantial
evidence supporting the damage award existed. 3 The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the limitation of judi-
cial review violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4 As observed by Justice Ste-
vens, "Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbi-
trary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typi-
cally leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing
amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defen-
dant's net worth creates the potential that juries will
use their verdicts to express biases against big busi-
ness, particularly those without strong local pres-
ences." 11 In both non-media cases, BMW and Honda,
the Supreme Court expressed reservations about the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards similar to
objections raised in earlier media libel cases.
Limits on punitive damages may be viewed as
one of many strategies for reforming and fine-tuning
the law of libel. Government policy makers and media
leaders constantly explore proposals to modify the
balance between two competing legal interests, free-
dom of the press and the individual's right to protect
a reputation. Both legal interests are essential to a
free society. Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt,
wrote that the right to protect a reputation "reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being-a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty"56 Stewart
argued that the protection of reputation, even though
primarily defined by state law, deserves as much pro-
tection as rights articulated in the U.S. Constitution.57
Despite Stewart's arguments about
the primacy of the right to protect
reputation, libel law reform gener-
4Ja' J$ to ally involves an incremental expan-
sion of freedoms enjoyed by the
press with a simultaneous contrac-
tiffS tlU~t tion in the law of defamation.
One way to reshape libel law
is to increase barriers to libel suits
by strengthening the basic elements
which libel plaintiffs must prove.The Supreme Court
followed this practice in New York Times and Gertz
when it created a fifth, required element in libel suits-
that of fault. 58 In New York Times, the Court required
a showing of fault in the form of actual malice as a
means for limiting the recovery of public officials in
libel cases. 9 In Gertz, the Court required a private
figure bringing a libel suit to prove some degree of
fault.60 The Gertz Court further allowed the states
to select the appropriate fault standard provided they
did not impose strict liability or liability without fault.
61
The Court further strengthened the pre-existing libel
element of identification in New York Times, requiring
that elected officials clearly establish that they were
identified in the defamatory message and that the
story or advertisement was "of and concerning" the
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plaintiff.62 Similarly, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,
the Supreme Court tinkered with another traditional
libel element, that of falsity.63 According to Hepps, a
successful libel claim required the plaintiff to prove the
falsity of the statement made by the defendant; the
plaintiff would not be afforded a presumption of falsity.64
While enhancing the basic elements of a libel suit may
offer greater protection to the media from libel suits,
strengthening the defenses available to a defendant in
a libel suit provides another avenue of protection.
Strengthening defenses to libel actions such as
fair comment or opinion, qualified privilege, libelproof,
the statute of limitations, and correction and retrac-
tion statutes provide additional avenues for the pro-
tection of defendants and for libel reform. The rare
defense of libelproof applies when a court concludes
the reputation of a libel plaintiff is damaged to such a
degree that it cannot be harmed by a new defamation."6
The common law defense of fair comment protects
the right of journalists, commentators and reviewers
to criticize those who share their creations with the
public-everyone from actors and professional ath-
letes to restaurant chefs and architects. 66 Qualified
privilege, a defense existing in different forms in every
state and often referred to as "the most important
common-law defense in the post-Times v. Sullivan era,"
protects journalists who report defamatory comments
made in official proceedings from libel liability pro-
vided their stories are fair and accurate. 67 The stat-
ute of limitations represents the limited time period
during which a libel suit may be initiated following an
incident of alleged libel. 68 A short statute of limitations
typically benefits media defendants while a long stat-
ute benefits libel plaintiffs.69 Libel retraction laws also
vary considerably from state to state. Thirty states
limit libel recovery by statute when the media retract
defamatory falsehoods. 70 The protection offered by
libel retraction statutes varies from prohibitions on
punitive damages to restricting damages to out-of-
pocket losses. 7' The Uniform Correction Act, offi-
cially titled the Uniform Correction or Clarification of
Defamation Act, was drafted and approved in 1993 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and later endorsed by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association and by the
American Association of Newspaper Editors. 72 The
Uniform Correction Act would strengthen the protec-
tion for the news media in many states by requiring
that recoverable damages be restricted to provable,
actual damages in instances where the media publishes
a proper correction to an incident of defamation. 73
Strengthening out-of-court forums for libel dis-
putes provides a method for modifying the impact of
libel litigation without changing the actual law. Robert
Chandler, a former publisher of a daily newspaper
in Eastern Oregon, advocated a simplified arbitration
procedure to resolve conflicts between potential libel
plaintiffs and newspapers. 7 Other observers of the
news media have advocated the creation of news
councils to resolve disputes concerning the accuracy
and balance of news stories. 7 Supporters of such
councils attest to their ability to reduce the incidence
of libel suits. 76 A study of the quantity of libel litigation
in Minnesota before and after the creation of the Min-
nesota News Council found that libel suits increased
less in the Gopher state than in the border states
of Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota and South Dakota,
states without news councils. 77
In conclusion, a great variety of proposals exist
for modifying the substance and impact of libel law.
They include legislative and judicial proposals, state
and federal proposals, and legal and non-legal (or out-
of-court) proposals. Of those proposals, the Supreme
Court and other legal policy makers pay considerable
attention to the concept of limiting or prohibiting
punitive damages.
Ill. M to g a Is P
This Article relies on a methodology for the
legal research of mass communication that evaluates
the impact of a legal provision by measuring the
number and quality of relevant appellate court deci-
sions.The Minnesota News Council study, cited earlier,
provides one illustration of this methodology.78 That
study identified and coded all federal and state appel-
late decisions concerning media libel over a 39-year
period for five states. 79 One finding noted that fol-
lowing the creation of the Minnesota News Council,
libel appeals increased 149 percent in the states sur-
rounding Minnesota compared to an increase of only
55 percent in Minnesota.80 This approach of relying
on a proscribed universe of appellate court decisions
as a mirror of trial court activity works best for a sub-
ject such as libel. Both types of losing parties, plain-
tiffs and defendants, are strongly motivated and thus
more likely to appeal an adverse trial judgment. Losing
at trial motivates a libel plaintiff to appeal an adverse
judgment to the next higher court just as much as it
does a losing media defendant.
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Donald Gillmor and Melanie Grant used this
methodology in their empirical analysis of 614 media
libel appeals-all libel appeals reported by Media Law
Reporter for the seven years between 1982 and 1988.81
Among its findings, the Gillmor-Grant analysis revealed
that the number of libel appeals remained constant
from year to year. 82 The media won over 80 percent of
the cases following appeals.83 In support of their anal-
ysis, Gillmor and Grant provided a state-by-state chart
reporting the number of libel cases per million resi-
dents in each state.8I According to the authors,"states,
such as Massachusetts, Washington and Oregon, that
prohibit the awarding of punitive damages gain no
particular advantages for media defendants, nor does
Michigan, a state that has generally been unsympa-
thetic to punitive damages."8 According to the Gill-
mor and Grant analysis of seven years of libel appeals
in the fifty states, the presence or absence of punitive
damages did not make much of a difference.
The analysis conducted by Gillmor and Grant
provided data and comments relevant to the research
questions explored in thisArticle on punitive damages.
The application of state-level data from the Gillmor-
Grant study allowed for the comparison between the
punitive and non-punitive states analyzed in this Arti-
cle. However, contrary to the expected findings of this
Article, the Gillmor-Grant study revealed that non-
punitive states averaged 1.87 media libel appeals per
capita, compared to 1.23 libel appeals for the five puni-
tive damage states.86 This finding, based on data for
ten of the 50 states in the Gillmor-Grant study, contra-
dicted the anticipated results for the ten-state study in
this Article.
David Anderson, a professor at the University
of Texas Law School, utilized a methodology similar to
that used by Gillmor and Grant in his statistical analy-
sis of the 199 media cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 195 years from 1791 to 1986. 87 One
striking finding of Anderson's study was that with the
exception of theWarren Court years
of 1954-1969, media litigants gener-
ally lost more often than other classi-
fications of litigants appearing before
the Supreme Court.88 Paul Kostyu,
the Columbus bureau chief for the
Canton, Ohio, Repository and for-
merly a journalism faculty member at
Ohio Wesleyan University, also per- c t
formed research by analyzing a uni-
verse of cases. Kostyu examined a
decade of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
District of Columbia concerning freedom of expres-
sion issues.89 Kostyu's major finding was that judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents Lyndon Johnson
and Jimmy Carter supported free expression litigants
about 19 percent more often than judges appointed by
Republican President Ronald Reagan. 9° Kostyu dem-
onstrated the usefulness of analyzing a category of
cases from one court to measure the influence of a
characteristic of the justices such as political party.
Lastly, two national studies conducted by the
Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC) provided
methodological support for this approach of analyzing
court cases within a defined universe. 9' The two stud-
ies, one analyzing trial verdicts and the other focusing
on appellate-level decisions, documented the signifi-
cance of punitive damages in media libel cases. 92
The LDRC trial study examined the character-
istics of libel trial verdicts over a 19-year period (1980
through 1998) in all 50 states. 93 The LDRC, repre-
sented by media attorneys and media organizations
in every state, has created comprehensive databases
on media libel litigation at both the trial and appellate
levels. The LDRC trial study found that, on the aver-
age, the media won 37 percent of the 22 libel trials
held each year. 94 Of those trials, 78 percent took
place in state courts while the remaining 22 percent
took place in federal courts. 95 The trial study discov-
ered an average of $2.86 million in damages awarded
in the decade of the 1990s, twice the $1.44 million
averaged during the 1980s. 96 The trial study further
discovered that punitive damages contributed signifi-
cantly to the amount of trial damages awarded. 97 Fifty-
four percent of the cases awarding damages included
punitive damages as part of the award, with punitive
damages representing 61 percent of the total dam-
ages awarded. 98 The LDRC study demonstrated that
despite infrequent damage awards, punitive damages
dominate such awards when they arise.
-101-
FILM 8
The 19-year LDRC trial study also provided
some support for the research questions posed in this
Article.The trial study consisted of a variety of statis-
tical analyses and devoted several tables to state-by-
state comparisons. 99 When this state-level, LDRC
trial data was used to contrast the five states in this
Article with punitive damages (Alabama, New Mexico,
South Carolina, South Dakota,Tennessee) with the five
states without punitive damages (Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington), some patterns
emerged. 100 States without punitive damages aver-
aged 1.08 libel trials per million population, versus
1.58 trials per million for states with punitive dam-
ages. '' States without punitive damages awarded a
$193,000 median in total damages awarded compared
to $1,005,000 median in states with punitive damages.
.02 At the appellate level, non-punitive states awarded
an average of $70,000 in damages versus $249,000 in
punitive states. 103 These findings were consistent with
the research expectations of this Article.
The second LDRC study, an appeals court
study, focused exclusively on the appeals of media libel
cases over a fourteen year period from 1984 to 1998. 04
The appeals study found that 74 percent of the media
libel cases occurred in state courts, with the remaining
26 percent occurring in federal courts. 05 At the trial
level, media defendants won 28 percent of the cases
with plaintiffs winning the remaining 72 percent. 06 Sev-
enty percent of the overall damages awarded included
punitive damages. 107 Appellate courts, however, often
modified punitive damage awards to the media's ben-
efit. 108 Appellate courts either reversed or remanded
some 54 percent of adverse decisions against the
media. 1'09 They reversed or remanded an even higher
percentage-77 percent-of punitive damage awards
that were imposed upon the media. 1I0 The LDRC
study of libel appeals documented how punitive dam-
ages significantly contribute to total damages and how
appellate courts often react by reducing such awards.
In conclusion, a variety of researchers have
used the systematic analysis of a universe of media
cases and appeals to measure the impact of media law
provisions on punitive damage awards in libel suits.At
least one study, by Gillmor and Grant, contradicted
the research expectations explored in this Article.The
19-year LDRC trial study provided some support for
the research questions posed in this Article and sug-
gested that state prohibitions on libel damages may
actually depress libel litigation.
The analysis set forth in this Article sought to
compare the quantity and quality of media libel appeals
in states with and without punitive damages.The anal-
ysis explored two major research concerns. First, it
suspected a lower incidence of media libel appeals
in states without punitive damages because an attor-
ney's and potential libel plaintiff's knowledge of puni-
tive damage limitations would discourage some par-
ties from bringing libel suits. Second, it suspected a
lower average in total damages awarded in states with-
out punitive damages, in instances where a media libel
plaintiff prevailed at trial or on appeal. The analysis
ultimately suspected that a prohibition on punitive
damages would make a significant difference in the
total amount of damages awarded.
To keep this analysis at a manageable size, it
focused on ten years of cases in five punitive and
five non-punitive states. Alabama, New Mexico, South
Carolina, South Dakota and Tennessee represented
the punitive states while Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Oregon and Washington represented the
non-punitive states. The study classified states using
the LDRC 50-State Survey.'" The goal of this clas-
sification was to identify two groups of five states
that remained stable for a decade concerning punitive
damage awards. Detailed tables in the LDRC 50-State
Survey indicated a state's overall status on punitive
damages as well as whether the state recognized limits
on punitive damages created by the Supreme Court
in its Gertz decision, from retraction laws limiting
punitive damages, and from common law restrictions
on punitive damages. While each state included in
the study recognizes the Gertz restrictions, the study
excluded states recognizing common law restrictions.
The study ignores the issue of retraction law provi-
sions on punitive damages because it was felt that
retractions would affect only a small fraction of all
media libel cases.
The initial intent of the research method was
that separating states according to whether or not
they awarded punitive damages would create two large
groups allowing for the selection of matched pairs. For
example, a Southern state with a medium population
and punitive damages could be matched with a South-
ern state with a medium population and a prohibition
on punitive damages. However, the small number
of states that fell cleanly into the categories of puni-
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tive damages and non-punitive damages prevented the
desired matching scheme.
The analysis required the preparation of a
coding sheet for analyzing all state and federal media
libel appeals. Besides the name and citation of each
appeal, the sheet addressed twelve specific items: (I)
the ten numbered states; (2) whether or not the state
awarded punitive damages (yes or no); (3) the mass
medium at issue (newspaper, television, radio, maga-
zine, book, or other); (4) whether litigated in state or
federal court; (5) the year (1986 through 1995); (6)
whether the press emerged victorious at trial phase
(yes or no); (7) whether the matter was decided
via pretrial summary judgment (yes or no); (8) the
amount of general (non-punitive) damages awarded
after trial (in $ 1,000s); (9) the amount of punitive dam-
ages awarded after trial (in $ 1,000s); (10) whether
the press emerged victorious on appeal; (I I) the
amount of general (non-punitive) damages awarded
after appeal (in $ 1,000s); and (12) amount of punitive
damages awarded after appeal (in $1,000s).The entry
of these twelve case-specific items into a computer
database allowed for an analysis of the quantity and
quality of media libel appeals in punitive and non-puni-
tive states.
The study identified and analyzed media libel
appeals in two stages using the Internet legal database,
Lexis. The study first identified potential media libel
cases by conducting a search with the delimiters of
"libel" or "defamation" for appellate court decisions
for each of the ten states over the specified ten-year
period. A similar search was conducted of appellate
court decisions for the same ten states from the U.S.
Court of Appeals. 112
The next step was to examine each "libel" and
"defamation" appellate court decision to determine if
it involved mass media libel, which for purposes of this
study was defined as the content of a mass medium
libeling an individual or entity outside of that mass
medium. 113
After identifying the media libel appeals, a
coding sheet was completed for each case. Descriptive
statistics were then computed using a standard, com-
puter statistical program. The study did not use tests
of significance on a selective sample but instead ana-
lyzed an entire universe of libel cases. "4 The following
-103-
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findings summarize the descriptive statistics and dis-
cuss the major research concerns.
The initial Lexis search identified a total of
1,282 potential appeals, 981 (77 percent) potential
state appeals and 301 (23 percent) potential federal
appeals. An examination of each appeal determined
that only 121 qualified as a media libel appeal. 1"s
Of the 121 media libel appeals identified, 84
percent came from state courts and 16 percent from
federal courts, a proportion similar to those identi-
fied by other libel case studies. 117 The study further
revealed a fairly even dispersal of media appeals over
the years, with 58 percent filed in the first five years
and 42 percent filed in the second five years. Some
4 to 17 percent of appeals were filed in each year.
Similar to previous studies, some 60 percent of the
cases concerned newspapers. Newspapers, with their
in-depth and investigative reporting, find themselves
involved in potential libel situations more often than
other media. Cases involving the other media revealed
the following percentages: 29 percent for television; 8
percent for magazines; 2 percent for radio; 2 percent
for books; and 0 percent for other media.
The media faired quite well. Of the 121 cases,
the media emerged victorious 81 percent of the time
at the trial level and 74 percent of the time at the
appellate level. Courts decided approximately 87 per-
cent of these cases at the pre-trial, summary judg-
ment phases. I18 Media defendants view the availability
of pre-trial judgments in media libel cases favorably
because it can reduce the length, preparation and
expense of litigation.
Research for this study harbored concerns that
states prohibiting punitive damages would produce a
smaller incidence of media libel cases. It was hypoth-
esized that the unavailability of punitive damages in
states would discourage some potential libel plaintiffs
from initiating lawsuits. Similarly, the availability of
punitive damages in states would provide an additional
incentive that would motivate some libel plaintiffs to
follow through and sue for defamation. However, as
the Table indicates, this was not the case. 119 After
factoring in the populations of each state, calculations
revealed an average of 3.7 cases per million in states
without punitive damages compared to 3.3 cases for
states with punitive damages. 120 An alternate means of
&TV
calculation revealed an even greater disparity between
punitive and non-punitive states. Dividing the popula-
tions of the two groups of states by the total number
of media libel cases, the non-punitive damage states
averaged 4.15 cases to 2.74 for the punitive states. 121
Regardless of how the value was calculated, states
with punitive damages had a lower incidence of libel
appeals than cases without punitive damages, a result
contrary to the expectations of this study.
Comparing percentages of media victories for
non-punitive and punitive states produced minimal dif-
ferences. The media won 79 percent of the time at the
trial stage in non-punitive states, versus 85 percent in
punitive states. Courts granted pretrial summary judg-
ments 89 percent of the time in non-punitive states,
versus 83 percent in punitive states.The media won at
the appellate level 75 percent in non-punitive states,
versus 73 percent in punitive states. Furthermore,
86 percent of trials in non-punitive states occurred
in state courts versus 80 percent in punitive states.
These differences in the quality of media libel appeals
between punitive and non-punitive states were incon-
sequential and modest at best
Lastly, the study compared non-punitive and
punitive damage states for instances in which the
media lost and the plaintiff was awarded damages at
the trial level. Only nine of the 121 cases fell into this
category, five in non-punitive states and four in puni-
tive states. 22 By dividing those two numbers, four
and five, by the total populations in the two catego-
ries of states, we arrive at .26 cases with damages in
non-punitive states and .27 cases in punitive states. 123
Once again, the difference is inconsequential.
Only an examination of the magnitude of dam-
ages reveals a difference that favors non-punitive states.
In the non-punitive states, total damages awarded at
the trial level averaged $68,000, only 10 percent of the
$686,000 average for damages in the punitive states. 124
In punitive states, punitive damages accounted for 53
percent of the trial damages awarded, with other dam-
ages accounting for the remaining 47 percent. 121
Decisions of the appellate courts tend to
diminish the above mentioned differences between
non-punitive and punitive states. Of the five damage
awards in non-punitive states, only three survived
appeals as compared to only two of the four cases sur-
viving appeal in the punitive states. 126 After factoring
population, the study revealed .154 damage awards
in non-punitive states versus .137 in punitive states.
Additionally, $92,000 in total damages per case sur-
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vived appeal in non-punitive states versus $98,000 per
case in punitive states. Thus, decisions of the appel-
late courts tended to nullify the significant advantage
enjoyed by non-punitive damages states by reducing
great disparity in damages between non-punitive and
punitive states at the trial level.
Vt Cocuin an Dicsso 0
This study explored whether state prohibi-
tions on punitive damages influence the quantity and
quality of media libel litigation. Answering that ques-
tion involved a systematic analysis of all state and fed-
eral media libel appeals in ten states over a ten-year-
period.
For the most part, the status of punitive dam-
ages in a state did not affect libel litigation. First,
the quantity of libel appeals was about the same in
both non-punitive and punitive states. Second, trial
courts awarded damages in a comparable number
of instances. Third, following review by an appellate
court, the number of instances in which damages
were awarded was about the same. Fourth, following
review by an appellate court, the average total dam-
ages awarded was about the same in both types of
states.
The legal climate only proved more protective
for the media in states without punitive damages in
relation to damages awarded by trial courts. Trial
courts awarded average damages in an amount ten
times greater in punitive damage states than in non-
punitive damages states. These differences disappeared
following an appeal of the case.
Consequently, it cannot be argued that a state
prohibition in punitive damages provides the media
with significant protection against libel suits. One of
the appealing provisions of the Uniform Correction
Act, which was introduced a decade ago, is its limita-
tion of damages to concrete, provable losses. 127 Both
the Associated Press Managing Editors and the Amer-
ican Society of Newspaper Editors endorse the Act
but, to date, only one state legislature-that of North
Dakota-has adopted the model statute as law. 28
Large-scale media-metropolitan dailies and big city
TV news operations-appear unenthusiastic about the
Uniform Correction Act and apparently have not
encourage their state newspaper organizations and
broadcast associations to lobby for it in their legisla-
tures. A state legislature is not going to change the law
in an obscure field such as defamation unless major
organizations with a stake in the issue vigorously lobby
for the desired change. These big media managers
may not desire such reforms because they have con-
cluded that the status quo and existing libel laws best
benefit their operation. According to the findings of
this study, efforts made to lobby state legislatures to
change punitive damages or correction laws for libel
may be unnecessary.
A possibility that prohibitions on punitive dam-
ages do, in fact, depress libel litigation, remains a valid
consideration. However, the limited scope of this study
precluded the detection of that influence. Other varia-
tions in libel laws between the states may have masked
the impact of the differences in punitive damages. A
study of one decade and ten states may have been too
limited to detect any influence.
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siderable skill to devise a proposal for a uniform law
acceptable to delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion and to major journalism organizations. However,
only one rural state has bothered to adopt this uni-
form law. Media organizations constantly lobby a vari-
ety of issues in the state legislatures such as taxation,
regulation of advertising, privacy, state open records
laws and state open meetings laws. But the media
organizations, and the attorneys advising them, are
apparently satisfied with the balance between report-
ing rights and defamation protection that currently
exists in most states.
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